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Abstract. The field of behavioral finance has actively researched behavioral elements influencing the 
choices of individual investors. This study also contributes to the behavioral finance and examines the 
effect of an increase in a foreign firm’s partial ownership in a domestic firm on the local individual 
investments in that domestic firm. Specifically, using a controlled lab experiment the study examines 
the investments of Pakistani individual investors between a purely Pakistani firm and a Pakistani firm 
with three different levels of Chinese ownership (portfolio, minority, majority). The experimental results 
show that with reference to Chinese minority ownership in a Pakistani firm, the potential investors are 
47% (61%) less likely to invest in a Pakistani firm with Chinese portfolio (majority) ownership than in 
a purely Pakistani firm. The study uncovers an important non-monetary factor in the form of a foreign 
firm’s partial ownership that can significantly influence the choices of individual investors. It also makes 
an important contribution to the growing literature on the Chinese foreign investments specifically in 
Pakistan by exploring how potential individual Pakistani investors are likely to react to an increase in 
Chinese investments in Pakistani firms. 
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1. Introduction
With a rapid development in the financial markets across the world, the potential role of 
individual investors has increased manifold. The traditional utility maximization mod-
els assume that individual investors make rational and wealth maximizing investments, 
however, they do not explain the process of those investment decisions. On the other 
hand, behavioral finance relaxes some of the assumptions made in the traditional utility 
theories, tries to understand the decision process and examines the effect of non-mon-
etary factors on the investment decisions (Nagy & Obenberger, 1994). The field of be-
havioural finance has made significant strides in the last two decades and enhanced 
our understanding of the behavioural and psychological aspects of decisions made by 
the individual investors. However, to the best of our knowledge, studies that examine 
the effect of foreign partial ownership in a domestic firm on the local individual invest-
ments in such a domestic firm are almost non-existent. In the non-behavioral finance 
literature, limited studies that examined the influence of partial foreign acquisitions on 
the behavior of domestic investors (e.g., Huang & Shiu, 2009) relied on the natural 
data. Unfortunately, in the natural data, confounding effects of several factors that can 
simultaneously influence the decisions of individual investors make it difficult to iso-
late the exclusive effects of foreign ownership on the investment decisions. With rapid 
development and growth of financial markets specifically in the emerging economies 
and reduced barriers to cross country business investments accompanied by market 
liberalization, the potential role of individual investors has increased manifold and de-
mands an enhanced understanding of how partial acquisitions influence the behavior of 
individual investors. In the absence of such an understanding, foreign firms undertak-
ing partial acquisitions with the aim of maintaining certain ratio of domestic investors 
might not achieve their objectives efficiently. Keeping in view enhanced cross-border 
investments and a limited understanding about how these investments influence the 
decisions of individual investors, this paper examines the influence of partial ownership 
on the domestic individual investments in the target domestic firm. Specifically, the 
paper makes the following novel contributions to the behavioral finance literature. 1) It 
proposes a behavioral model to understand how individual investors choose between 
a purely domestic firm and a domestic firm that has partial ownership of a foreign firm. 
The behavioral model predicts that individual investors choose a foreign-owned do-
mestic firm over a purely domestic firm until a certain ratio of the presence of a foreign 
firm beyond which individual investors prefer to invest in the purely domestic firm. 
The proposed behavioral model is among the first ones to offer a useful theoretical 
background to systematically understand the decision process of individual investors 
dependent on the ratio of a foreign firm. Also, the proposed model offers a relatively 
new avenue of application of utility functions based on non-monetary parameters to 
study international business from a behavioral perspective. 2) The behavioral model is 
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tested with the help of a controlled lab experiment performed in the context of Pakistan 
(developing economy) and China (a relatively developed economy). The use of a lab 
experiment enables us to control for exogenous variables that can influence investors in 
real life and therefore offers a controlled environment to test the behavioral model. The 
experimental results support the predictions of the proposed investor model; Pakistani 
investors are more likely to invest in the Chinese-owned Pakistani firms than purely Pa-
kistani firms when the Chinese entity is a minority investor (22% share) as compared to 
the scenario in which the Chinese entity is a portfolio (9% share) or a majority investor 
(60% share). 3) To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to use experimen-
tal methodology for analyzing the influence of partial acquisitions on the individual 
investments, and hence informs our understanding about the applicability of the ex-
perimental tools for the international business research. Specifically, as ratio of partial 
acquisition normally does not change in a short duration in real life, analysis of changes 
in partial acquisition of investment decisions would require time series data that do not 
perfectly control changes in numerous exogenous factors in the international market. 
On the other hand, by using lab experiments this can be achieved in a precise manner 
in a short duration with limited resources. Also, in cases where no previous natural data 
exist, instead of making a relatively uninformed decision, potential firms planning to 
undertake partial acquisitions can use experiments to measure investor behavior in the 
target country. 4) The study adds relatively new findings to the growing literature on 
the investment biases by reporting individual investment decisions biased by the for-
eign firm’s presence in the domestic firm. These findings can be very useful for firms 
planning foreign investments in a manner that does not significantly alter individual 
domestic investments in the target firm. 5) Lastly, the study further extends the grow-
ing literature on the Chinese foreign investments specifically in Pakistan by exploring 
the research question in the China – Pakistan context. As the study examines home 
bias from a new angle, the results offer useful behavioral insights of potential Pakistani 
investors to the Chinese firms planning to partially acquire Pakistani firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief literature review. 
Section 3 presents the behavioral investor model and hypotheses. Section 4 reports the 
experimental design, while Section 5 reports result and robustness checks.  The last sec-
tion concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
There are numerous studies in the existing literature that have examined different biases 
influencing the decisions of individual investors. A review of relatively recent studies 
reveals that decisions of individual investors are influenced by behavioral factors such 
as extraversion and neuroticism (Oehler, Wendt, Wedlich & Horn, 2018; Zhang, Xian 
& Fang, 2019), overconfidence (Meier, 2018), days of the week (Richards & Willows, 
30
ISSN 2029-4581   eISSN 2345-0037   Organizations and Markets in Emerging Economies
2019), framing of portfolios (Steul, 2006), disposition effect1 (Fogel & Berry, 2006), 
home bias2 (Kilka & Weber, 2000; Huberman, 2001; for a literature review of home 
bias please see Lewis, 1999), representativeness bias3 (Chen, Kim, Nofsinger & Rui, 
2007) and cultural values ( Ji, Zhang & Guo, 2008). In addition, perceptions about 
firms developed through channels of awareness and brand quality (Frieder & Sub-
rahmanyam, 2005), personal experience (Schoenbachler, Gordon & Aurand, 2004; 
Nicolosi, Peng, & Zhu, 2009), type and structure of governance of firms (Aspara & 
Tikkanen, 2010; Duncan & Hasso, 2018), gender (Charness & Gneezy, 2012), risk 
preferences (Sokolowska & Makowiec, 2017) and other similar factors also influence 
the investment decisions. Along with behavioral finance literature, empirical studies 
have also examined various factors that affect the investor decisions. For example, Tes-
ar and Werner (1995) examined investments in securities, corporate and government 
bonds based on data from Canada, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA and found 
stronger preferences for the domestic firms over foreign firms even for riskless invest-
ments in bonds. Similarly, Huang and Shiu (2009) examined the relation of foreign 
partial ownership to the ratio of stocks held by insiders (officers and members of the 
board of directors) in the Taiwanese market and found that the proportion of stocks 
held by insiders is maximum when foreign ownership is minimum. On the other hand, 
there are studies such as Coval and Moskowitz (1999) that examined the effects of 
geographical proximity of the domestic firms on investments of money managers in 
the US and reported that money managers are more likely to invest in firms in their 
geographical proximity compared to the distantly located firms. Similarly, Massa and 
Simonov (2006) also report that investors prefer stocks of companies in proximity. 
In summary, both behavioral and non-behavioral factors can influence the individual 
investment decisions. 
As the current study examines the effect of different ratios of a foreign acquirer, it is 
also relevant to discuss here different shareholder structures that are often observed in 
the cross-border investments.  In the international business literature, if a foreign firm 
acquires less than 10% shares of a local firm, it is termed as ‘foreign portfolio invest-
ment’ (FPI). FPI does not offer any opportunity to the foreign investor to influence the 
managerial decisions of the local firms (Demirbag, Glaister & Tatoglu, 2007; Wu, Li & 
Selover, 2012). On the other hand, foreign investments that occupy at least 10% shares 
of the local firm are categorized as foreign direct investment (FDI). Foreign investors 
undertaking FDI can partially or completely influence the managerial decisions of the 
local firms (Ahmed & Bebenroth, 2019). The international business literature further 
classifies FDI into investments with minority control (10%-50% ownership) and ma-
1 Disposition effect: Individual investors sell appreciating investments prematurely while delay loss-making 
investments (Fogel & Berry, 2006).
2 Home bias: Individual investors are overconfident about the relative performance of the domestic firms in 
comparison to the foreign firms (Duxbury, 2015). 
3 Representativeness bias: Investors believe that past returns reflect future returns of a firm (Chen et al., 2007). 
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jority control (more than 50% ownership) (Demirbag et al., 2007; Ouimet, 2013; Gan 
& Qiu, 2019; Waqar, 2020).
Numerous factors can influence a foreign investor’s ownership level in a local firm 
(for review please see Chhabra et al., 2021). This decision is often affected by the cul-
tural differences that exist in the countries of foreign and local firms (Malhotra, 2012). 
Regulatory authorities in the target country often discourage foreign investors from 
having a majority stake (Cui & Jiang, 2012). From a foreign firm’s perspective, the deci-
sion is quite often driven by the foreign investor’s intention to take an active or a passive 
role in the managerial decisions. In the case of FPI, foreign investors are unable to influ-
ence the managerial decision of local firms (Wang & Li, 2018). In contrast, the minor-
ity control investments allow foreign investors to take a more active role in managing 
the local firms. At the same time, the extent of influence that foreign firms exert on the 
managerial decisions of their local firms is dependent on other shareholders and, more 
importantly, on whether other shareholders are willing to collude to resist the decisions 
of the foreign investors (Chang, 2004). When other shareholders are large in number 
and unwilling to collude, even a minority control investment gives a lot of power to the 
foreign investors. In contrast, foreign investors with minority control can have limited 
authority when other shareholders include seasoned institutional investors of the host 
country (Goldstein & Razin, 2006). Also, foreign investors have limited power when 
regulatory bodies in the host country are keen on protecting the disaggregated share-
holders (La Porta et al., 2000). This brings us to the unique benefits that a majority 
control provides to the foreign investors. By acquiring more than 50% of local firms’ 
shares, the foreign investors with majority control face minimal to no resistance when 
taking any major or minor decisions related to their target local firm (Dang et al., 2018). 
3. A Behavioral Model of an Individual Investor
Here we propose a model to examine local investors’ choice of a purely domestic firm 
versus a foreign-owned domestic firm considering varying levels of the presence of a 
foreign firm. For a representative investor, this single period investment decision I can 
be represented by the following utility function: 
���� � ���∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅����� � �� ------- (1) 
 
 (1)
where ���� � ���∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅����� � �� ------- (1) 
 
 = Sum of ownership ratio of j foreign investors in the target domestic firm. 
Foreign investments can be divided into foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and foreign 
direct investment (FPI). In the former, foreign investors have no role in the managerial 
decisions, while in the latter case, foreign investors play an active role in the managerial 
decisions. The current model considers both FPI and FDI as foreign investments, and 
no further distinction is made in this regard. 
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Vector V is composed of the following variables:
M = Money for investment
R = Risk associated to the investment
r = Expected return from the investment
FB = Target firm’s business 
P = Perceptions about the foreign firm. These perceptions generally depend on the 
past and current performance of the firm, its core business, acceptance and perfor-
mance of its products, current management, expected future performance and other 
such variables (Nagy & Obenberger, 1994). 
In the natural data on individual investments, multiple elements of the investment 
function specified by Equation (1) simultaneously effect the investment decision and 
therefore make it difficult to isolate the exclusive influence of ownership ratio of a foreign 
firm on the behavior of domestic investors. To control for it, we use lab experiments as 
they offer a controlled environment to isolate the effects of treatment variable on the 
behavior. In our experimental setting, we treat money for investment (M), risk (R), re-
turns (r), and type of business of the target firm (FB) as constants. We also use a hypo-
thetical foreign investor firm and a hypothetical domestic target firm in the experiment 
and hence control firm specific perceptions. As a result, the only variable that changes in 
the decision process is the ownership ratio of the foreign investor and subsequently, the 
utility function in Equation (1) with riskless investments can be modified to: 
���� � ���∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅����� �   (2)
As per above equation, the investment decision depends on the ownership ratio of 
the foreign investors. In the current paper, the analysis is limited to only one foreign in-
vestor, however Equation (2) allows for multiple firms. For one foreign investor Equa-
tion (2) is reduced to: 
 
 In the context of this study, i.e. for a target firm of a developing economy (Pakistan) 
and investor from a relatively developed economy (China), we assume:
 ------- A 
 
 A
Condition A indicates that individual investor’s preference for a foreign-owned 
domestic firm over a purely domestic firm increases with an increase in a foreign in-
vestor’s ownership ratio. This condition is hypothesized based on the observation that 
most firms (specifically from the developed world) undertaking FDI have generally 
performed well in the past, financially are more stable and possess a relatively robust 
business model compared to most purely domestic firms in the developing economies 
(Geleilate, Magnusson, Parente & Alvarado-Vargas, 2016). Moreover, firms from the 
developed economies undertaking FDI often possess superior technology and bet-
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ter managerial skills that can be a source of competitive advantage even for the target 
firms (Isobe, Makino & Montgomery, 2000).   All these attributes of the foreign firms 
undertaking FDI send positive signals to the local investors in the target country. As a 
result, the local investors are likely to prefer foreign-owned domestic firms over purely 
domestic firms as the ownership ratio of foreign investors increases in the target firm. 
This assumption is relevant specifically in the current paper that is set up in the context 
of Chinese investments in Pakistani firms because China is a comparatively developed 
country with a strong economic base and expanding foreign direct investments, while 
Pakistan is a developing economy. Apart from the China – Pakistan context, Condi-
tion A is generally applicable to investments from the developed to the developing 
countries.
While the presence of a foreign firm can be perceived as positive, beyond a certain 
point, the local investors can take it negatively as well because the acquirer gains signif-
icant control in the target firm. This increasing control by a foreign entity can be per-
ceived as invasive, opportunistic, or unfair by the nationals of the target country, and in 
such a scenario, target country’s individual investors can decrease their investments in 
the foreign-owned domestic firms (Coleman, 1993; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Also, as 
the foreign acquirer gains more than 50% stake in the target domestic firm, the domes-
tic investors can perceive the target firm close to a foreign entity rather than a domestic 
one. In the aforementioned case, home bias (preference for domestic firms) can trigger 
investors to prefer a purely domestic firm over a domestic firm significantly owned by 
the foreign entity. Moreover, to some extent the notion of ‘psychological ownership’ 
that represents a sense of possession associated to the domestic firm can also trigger 
investors to prefer a purely domestic firm over an impure domestic firm and hence in-
fluence their investment decisions (Pierce, Kostova & Dirks, 2001; Kirk, McSherry & 
Swain, 2015, p. 187). Based on these reasons, Condition B is specified. 
 ------- B 
 
 B
Even though behavioral model specifies certain outcomes related to the domestic 
investor’s behavior based on the ownership of foreign firms, these outcomes also indi-
rectly reflect the extent of control exercised by the foreign acquirer. Although we do not 
explicitly incorporate the extent of control exercised by the foreign acquirer, it is natural 
to imagine a positive correlation between the extent of ownership of a foreign firm and 
its control in the target firm. Therefore, the investment decision is dependent on the 
dual nature of investment ratio that reflects the ownership as well as control exercised 
by the foreign acquirer. 
Based on conditions A and B, a unique ownership share of foreign acquirer (RFP*) 
maximizes domestic individual investments (I*) in the foreign-owned domestic firm. 
Any share of the foreign firm less or more than this unique ownership share reduces 
individual investments in the foreign-owned domestic firm. RFP* that maximizes I* de-
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pends on the domestic target firm and foreign investor. It is important to discuss here a 
possible situation in which Condition B (i-e-   ) of the investor model cannot 
be traced. If RFP  RFP*, Condition B cannot be identified. Only when RFP > RFP*, 
Condition B of the model is traceable. To maximize the possibility of observing Con-
dition B, the experiment employed a relatively high ratio (60%) of the Chinese foreign 
investment in a Pakistani firm. 
Based on the investor model the hypotheses to be tested are:
Hypothesis 1: There exists a share of a foreign acquirer (RFP*) in the ownership structure 
of the target firm that attracts maximum domestic individual investments (I*) in bonds of 
the target domestic firm.
Hypotheses 2: Any share of a foreign acquirer (RFP) less than RFP* will attract individual 
investment I less than I*. 
Hypothesis 3: Any share of a foreign acquirer (RFP) more than RFP* will attract individual 
investment I less than I*. 
4. Experimental Methodology 
Lab experiments are used for this study because they provide a controlled environment 
for studying the sole impacts of a variable under consideration, offer a suitable setting 
for finding causal relations, are relatively easier to replicate and involve decision-making 
with real money. Moreover, many of the key variables associated to the real investment 
choices (such as perceptions about the country of origin of a foreign acquirer) unob-
servable in the natural data can be directly observed and precisely measured in the lab 
experiments (Baltussen & Post, 2011; Brandts & Charness, 2011; Duxbury, 2015). 
However, as lab experiments are generally performed with students who might not 
have significant investment experience, their external validity is often questioned by 
the practitioners. Despite limited external validity, lab experiments with student sub-
jects are extensively used in the existing behavioral finance and economics literature to 
achieve an enhanced understanding of the decision process of individual investors un-
der various scenarios (for details please see the survey papers of Duxbury, 1995, 2015; 
Noussair & Tucker, 2013 that summarize numerous experiments on the individual in-
vestment decisions and asset markets using student subjects). Due to the aforemen-
tioned advantages of the lab experiments and their extensive usage in the existing litera-
ture, this study also relies on the experimental methodology.
4.1 China – Pakistan Context 
The experiment in this study is set up in the China – Pakistan context. With a popula-
tion of 212 million and GDP of 312.57 billion USD, Pakistan can be categorized as a 
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developing economy4. Pakistan also exhibits traits of a developing financial market; it 
has comparatively fragile corporate governance, weak regulatory environment and a rela-
tively weak rule of law as well5 (Ahmed & Hla, 2019). Despite the aforementioned orga-
nizational challenges, Pakistan’s stock market has shown exceptional performance even 
during the Covid-19 pandemic and has recently emerged as the best performing stock 
market in Asia6. As a result of this exceptional performance, Pakistan’s stock market has at-
tracted both local and foreign investors. China, on the other hand, is a relatively developed 
economy and well known for its rapidly expanding foreign direct investments especially in 
the developing economies. The selection of the China-Pakistan context is important and 
interesting to explore because: 1) Pakistan and China have geographical proximity, and 
both countries share land border. 2) Both countries have maintained historic economic 
and political ties and both occupy an important position in the Asian region. 3) The in-
vestment decision in the experiment is a binary variable (a choice between a purely do-
mestic firm and a foreign-owned domestic firm) and does not consider heterogeneity (in 
terms of nationality) in the foreign firms. For the aforementioned decision setting, it is 
appropriate to choose a host country where FDI from a single foreign country dominates 
other foreign countries. Pakistan fulfills this requirement as 89% of its FDI inflows come 
from China7 and subsequently Chinese firms are major foreign investors in the Pakistani 
market. 4) Chinese foreign investments specifically under the ‘One Belt & One Road’ ini-
tiative hold special economic importance to both China and Pakistan. These investments 
have boosted jobs, helped in poverty alleviation, sprung up infrastructure (especially road 
and rail networks and seaport developments), opened new avenues of trade and helped 
Pakistan in overcoming power shortages8. 5) Apart from foreign direct investments, Chi-
nese investors have also been actively conducting foreign portfolio investments in Paki-
stan. In a recent study, Liaqat et al. (2020) find that due to increasing Chinese portfolio 
investments in Pakistan, the stock market performance in both countries has shown high 
correlation suggesting that strategic interests of both countries are aligned. 6) The public 
sentiment towards massive Chinese investments under the  ‘One Belt & One Road’ initia-
tive has been a mixed one: some support while others oppose them (Kanwal, Chong & 
Pitafi, 2019; Mahmood, Sabir & Ali, 2020). This mixed public reaction itself demands an 
enhanced understanding about the exclusive effects of Chinese partial ownership in the 
Pakistani firms on the behavior of local investors towards those Pakistani firms. For all 
these reasons the China – Pakistan context is selected to explore the research questions. 
4 Source: The World Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan  
5 Source: World Governance Indicators. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports 
6 Since March, Pakistan equities have performed all other Asia countries, making it a lucrative investment hub 
for local and foreign investors. Source: Business Standard. https://www.business-standard.com/article/
international/pakistan-asia-s-best-performing-stock-market-is-just-getting-started-120082600094_1.html 
7 Source: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). http://www.cpecinfo.com/news/china-accounts-for-
89-percent-of-pakistan-fdiinflows/NjQyMw 
8 Source: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).  http://www.cpecinfo.com/news/a-detailed-analysis-
of-the-impact-of-cpec-on-pakistan/NTcyNA
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4.2 Experimental Design 
In a lab, the investment behavior can be observed by creating either an artificial stock 
or a bond market. In the classical finance literature, shares are treated as equity financ-
ing, while bonds are referred to as debt financing. As returns from stocks are variable, 
we use a hypothetical bond market because it offers fixed returns (riskless investment) 
and subsequently renders the investor’s decision uninfluenced by their risk preferences. 
Also, in the case of stocks, the ownership of individual investors in comparison to a 
foreign firm’s ownership would change depending on the varying ownership ratio of 
the foreign firm. Therefore, apart from foreign firm’s ownership, the varying relative 
ownership of individual investors can play a significant role when deciding whether to 
invest in a purely local or an impure local firm. In order to avoid this confounding effect, 
we relied on the bond market. Subjects taking the role of investors in the experiment 
are paid on spot according to their decisions to minimize the influence of discounting 
and time preferences (Tanaka, Camerer & Nguyen, 2010; Castillo, Ferraro, Jordan & 
Petrie, 2011; Cohen, Ericson, Laibson & White, 2020). Subjects participating in the ex-
periment are presented with a decision problem that allows them to invest money in a 
purely Pakistani firm or a Pakistani firm having partial Chinese ownership in it. Ackert, 
Church, Tompkins and Zhang (2005) provide experimental evidence that disclosing 
the name of the foreign firm influences portfolio of choices; in order to avoid this con-
founding effect, the current experiment uses hypothetical names for both Pakistani and 
Chinese firms. Moreover, the use of hypothetical names minimizes the possible influ-
ence of firm specific positive or negative perceptions9 and the effect of preferences for 
products produced by a firm on the investment decisions in that firm. It is often argued 
that hypothetical decisions in lab experiments cannot be treated as actual investment 
decisions. While this caveat of lab experiments holds significance, it is important to 
highlight here that even the process of real decision making is essentially hypothetical 
at its core. Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck and Perner (2002) argue that “the core 
process of real decision making consists of imagining and evaluating hypothetical op-
tions, and that this core process is the same for hypothetical decisions” (Kühberger et 
al., 2002, p. 1163). Hence even the hypothetical decisions made in a lab experiment 
can advance our understanding about the underlying process of making real investment 
decisions. 
As already discussed in the literature review section, in the international business 
literature, a firm with less than 10% share in the target firm is usually categorized as ‘for-
eign portfolio investment’ (FPI) and cannot influence managerial decisions of the tar-
get firm (Demirbag, Glaister & Tatoglu, 2007; Wu, Li & Selover, 2012). On the other 
9 The perceptions about China as a country and general perceptions about Chinese and Pakistani firms can 
however influence these decisions. These perceptions are measured with the help of a post-experimental 
survey and subsequently used in the analysis to control for their possible effects on the investment decisions. 
The survey questions and their results are reported in Appendix A.
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hand, firms with at least 10% shares of the target firm are categorized as foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and can partially or completely influence the managerial decisions 
of the target firm (Ahmed & Bebenroth, 2019). The international business literature 
further divides FDI into investments with minority control (10%-50% ownership) and 
majority control (more than 50% ownership) (Demirbag et al., 2007; Ouimet, 2013; 
Gan & Qiu, 2019; Waqar, 2020). Based on the aforementioned information, foreign 
firms can have three different ownership positions: portfolio investment, minority in-
vestment and majority investment10. Following the existing international business liter-
ature, we use a similar classification in the experiment, and the Chinese firm takes three 
investment positions: portfolio (9%); minority (22%); majority (60%). The amount 
of investment is 100,000 experimental units (50 Pakistani rupees)11 for all three cases 
while the guaranteed return offered by both types of firms (pure Pakistani versus Paki-
stani firm with Chinese presence) is also 100,000 experimental units. In total, subjects 
can earn 200,000 experimental units (100 rupees) from their investments. The decision 
problem presented to the subjects is reported in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 Investment Decision Problem
Cases Ownership details of Company A Ownership details of Company B
Case 1 100% ownership with Pakistani 91% owned by Pakistani and 9% by Chinese.
The decision power is fully exercised by Pakistani 
owners. Chinese investors do not have any deci-
sion powers.
Case 2 100% ownership with Pakistani 78% owned by Pakistani and 22% owned by 
Chinese.
The decision power mainly rests with Pakistani 
owners, but Chinese investors can influence the 
management decisions.
Case 3 100% ownership with Pakistani 40% owned by Pakistani and 60% owned by 
Chinese.
The decision power is fully exercised by the Chi-
nese investors*.
* This study classifies all companies with Chinese ownership greater than 50% (even the ones with 100% 
ownership) as majority investment mode. In accordance with the corporate control literature, we mention it 
explicitly that the decision power is fully exercised by the Chinese investors.
10 Several international business studies make a distinction between the majority investment mode (51-99% 
ownership) and the full investment mode (100% ownership). These studies argue that full investment mode 
provides greater autonomy to the foreign firms. However, in accordance with the corporate control literature, 
this study does not make any such distinction (Chari et al., 2010; Ouimet, 2013).
11 At the time of experiment, 200 Pakistani rupees were approximately equal to 0.96 USD (104.75 Pakistani 
rupees = 1 USD). 100 rupees at the time of experiment were enough to buy a good meal at the university 
where the experiment was performed. 
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Subjects pick either Company A or Company B for three decision scenarios. In all 
three cases, Company A represents a firm with 100% Pakistani ownership, while Com-
pany B represents a Pakistani firm with increasing Chinese ownership as we move from 
Case 1 to Case 3. The three different ownership cases (9%; 22%; 60%) represent a case 
of portfolio investment (9%), minority investment (22%) and majority investment 
(60%), and these cutoffs are motivated by similar acquisition cutoffs used in the merg-
ers and acquisitions literature (Demirbag et al., 2007). The selection of a relatively high 
cutoff for majority investment (i.e. 60%) is also driven by the motive of tracing Condi-
tion B (  ) specified in the behavioral model. 
Subjects were instructed that randomly one of their three decisions would be se-
lected for payment purposes. This random payment mechanism (also termed as Ran-
dom Problem Selection Procedure by Beattie and Loomes (1997, p. 156) ensures that 
subjects treat each decision independently and in isolation (Beattie & Loomes, 1997). 
Subjects were also paid a fixed participation fee of 100 rupees. The participation fee 
was selected to match hourly earnings for a typical student in Pakistan, and was based 
on the participation fee reported in the recent experimental work of Umer (2020) in 
Pakistan12. The subjects were recruited by sharing information about the experiment 
in a microeconomics class for undergraduate students13. Those who voluntarily signed 
up for the experiment were directed to stay in class after the lecture and the experiment 
was administered. The duration of the experiment was 20 minutes, all the experimen-
tal materials (instructions, decision sheet and post experimental survey) were in the 
English language, and the experiment was administered with the help of paper. The 
experiment was performed at the Institute of Business Administration (IBA) located in 
Karachi, Pakistan, in the summer of 2019. The experimental instructions are presented 
in Appendix B. 
4.3 Data Analysis 
In the data analysis, the investment decision is treated as a binary variable taking on a 
value of 1 if the subject invests in a purely Pakistani firm and zero if the investment is 
in an impure Pakistani firm. For the aforementioned categorical outcome variable, first 
a comparison of proportions of investors opting for either purely Pakistani or impure 
Pakistani firms is performed with the help of a two-tailed proportions test (please see 
Table 2). As a robustness check, we also performed a nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis 
equality of proportions rank test, and the outcome is reported in the results section. 
Second, we performed a multi-logit regression analysis (ideal for binary outcome vari-
12 Umer (2020) used 100 Pakistani rupees as participation fee for a 30 minutes experiment. The participation fee 
of 100 rupees for a 20 minutes experiment used in this paper is comparable to that used by Umer (2020).
13 Recent experimental studies focusing on either international business or management research ( Pan et al., 
2020) also frequently use students as experimental subjects. The use of students as experimental subjects in 
the current study is in line with these studies.
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ables) with the aforementioned binary outcome variable and the ratio of Chinese for-
eign investment as the main explanatory variable (Regression 1 in Table 3) and with 
several control variables as well (Regression 2 in Table 3). To control for multiple deci-
sions made by subjects during the experiment, robust standard errors clustered around 
individual subject IDs are employed in the both regressions. The outcomes are reported 
as odds ratios, which facilitates the interpretation of results in percentage terms. All sta-
tistical analysis reported in this section is performed with the help of STATA.
5. Results 
75 subjects (average age = 20 years; Std. Dev.= 1.16) voluntarily participated in the 
experiment14. 47 (63%) of the subjects were male (average age = 20 years; Std. Dev.= 
1.30), while 28 (37%) were female (average age = 19 years; Std. Dev.= 0.77). 26 (35%) 
of the subjects were economics major, 25 (33%) business administration, 9 (12%) in 
economics and mathematics, 4 (5%) in each marketing and social sciences, 2 (3%) in 
each finance and computer science, while 3 (4%) of the subjects had not decided on 
their major yet. 68 (91%) subjects had knowledge about bonds, while 10 (13%) sub-
jects had experience of investment in either stocks or bonds. 
At first a comparison between proportion of subjects opting for a purely Pakistani 
firm and an impure Pakistani firm with Chinese presence is performed by using the test 
of proportions, and the output is reported in Table 2.
The analysis of Case 1 (a purely Pakistani firm versus a Pakistani firm with Chinese 
9% share in it) reveals that 59% subjects opted to invest in the purely Pakistani firm, 
while a significantly lower proportion of 41% opted to invest in the Pakistani firm with 
Chinese portfolio investment in it (p-value = 0.03). The analysis of Case 2 (a purely 
Pakistani firm versus a Pakistani firm with Chinese 22% share in it) reveals that 44% of 
the subjects invested in a purely Pakistani firm, while significantly higher 56% invested in 
the Pakistani firm with Chinese minority investment in it (p-value = 0.04). The analysis 
of Case 3 (a purely Pakistani firm versus a Pakistani firm with Chinese 60% share in it) 
reveals that 65% subjects invested in the purely Pakistani firm, while significantly lower 
35% invested in the Pakistani firm with majority investment in it. Based on the afore-
mentioned results, the investment ratio of the Chinese firm that attracts maximum indi-
vidual investors (RFP*) turns out to be 22%, while corresponding maximized propor-
tion of individual investors (I*) turns out to be 56%. These results support Hypothesis 1.
An assessment of subjects investing in the impure Pakistani firm with Chinese share 
in it reveals that as Chinese share increases from 9% to 22%, the proportion of individ-
ual investors investing in that firm increases from 41% to 56% (p-value = 0.07). This 
result lends support to the second hypothesis. On the other hand, as Chinese share in 
the Pakistani firm increases from 22% to 60%, the individual investor’s proportion de-
14  The data that supports the findings of this study are available in the supplementary materials. 
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creases from 56% to 35% (p-value = 0.00), and this result supports the third hypothesis. 
The Kruskal-Wallis equality of proportions rank test also confirms that the proportion 
of subjects investing in the impure Pakistani firm with three different Chinese invest-
ment levels (9%; 22%; 60%) is statistically different (χ2(2) = 7.22, p-value = 0.03). 
TABLE 2 Statistical Analysis of the Investment Decisions 
Pakistani Share Chinese Share z-stat
Case 1 100% 9%
Choice 44/75 (59%) 31/75 (41%) -2.12** (0.034)
Std. Dev. [0.496] [0.496]  
Case 2 100% 22%
Choice 33/75 (44%) 42/75 (56%) 2.09** (0.036)
Std. Dev. [0.50] [0.50]
z-stat -1.80* (0.072)
Case 2 100% 22%
33/75 (44%) 42/75 (56%)
Case 3 100% 60%
Choice 49/75 (65%) 26/75 (35%) -3.76*** (0.000)
Std. Dev. [0.48] [0.48]
z-stat 2.62*** (0.009)
z-stat is from the two-tailed test of proportions, and the numbers next to z-stat in parentheses represent p-
value. For Case 2 (a purely Pakistani firm versus a Pakistani firm with 22% Chinese presence), one-tailored 
test of proportions is used. Std. Dev. = Standard Deviations. *** Significant at 1%; *Significant at 10%.
To further analyze these results and control for other factors that can possibly influ-
ence the investment behavior, logistic regressions analysis is also performed. The de-
pendent variable is investment decision, and it takes a value of 1 if the subject invests in 
a Pakistani firm with Chinese share in it, and it takes value of 0 if the subject invests in 
a Pakistani firm with no Chinese share. The robust standard errors are clustered around 
individual subject IDs to control for the multiple decisions made by each subject. The 
results in the form of odds ratios are reported in Table 3. 
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TABLE 3 Investment Behavior: Results from the Logistic Regression (Odds Ratios)
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2
Chinese Share (Ref = 22%)
9%
0.55* 0.53*
(0.17) (0.18)
60%
0.42*** 0.39***
(0.13) (0.13)
Male
0.90
(0.24)
Age
1.11
(0.12)
Investment Experience
0.48*
(0.21)
Knowledge of bonds
1.98
(0.99)
Perception of China Ref (China is best friend + friend of Pakistan)
Neither friend nor enemy
0.59
(0.36)
Enemy of Pakistan
0.65
(0.34)
Worst Enemy of Pakistan
0.34*
(0.19)
Perception of Pakistani firms  (Ref: Pakistani firms better than Chinese firms)
Worse than Chinese
2.23**
(0.76)
As good as Chinese
1.60
(0.46)
Perception of Chinese firms (Ref: Chinese firms worse than Pakistani firms)
Better than Pakistani firms
5.08***
(2.72)
As good as Pakistani firms
4.69***
(2.57)
Constant 
1.27 0.02*
(0.30) (0.05)
Controls No Yes
Pseudo R-Squared 0.024 0.070
Observations 225 225
Male = 1 if the subject is male. Robust standard errors clustered around individual IDs are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.01.
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Table 3 reports output from two regressions: Regression 1 is without controls, while 
Regression 2 controls for demographics, investment experience, knowledge of bonds, 
and heterogeneity in the perceptions about Pakistani firms, Chinese firms and China as 
a country. The main independent variable ‘Chinese share’ represents three investment 
shares of the Chinese firm: portfolio (9%), minority (22%) and majority (60%), with 
minority investment specified as base category in the regression. The regression results 
for the main variable do not change even after adding several control variables, and 
hence the output of Regression 2 that has control variables is discussed here. The out-
put for the main variable (Chinese Share) indicates that subjects are 47% less likely to 
invest in a Pakistani firm with Chinese portfolio investment and 61% less likely to invest 
in a Pakistani firm with Chinese majority investment than a Pakistani firm with Chinese 
minority investment. The regression results for the main independent variable support 
all three hypotheses and are also in line with results from the test of proportions and 
the Kruskal-Wallis test. However, it is important to mention here that the coefficient for 
9% Chinese ownership is marginally significant in the regression analysis and lends a 
relatively weaker support to Hypothesis 2. This can be due to a relatively narrow gap be-
tween portfolio investment ratio (9%) and minority investment ratio (22%) compared 
to a more profound gap between minority investment and majority investment (60%). 
Further analysis with wider gap between the portfolio and minority investment ratios 
is left for future research. 
The effect of gender, age, and knowledge of bonds has an insignificant effect on the 
investment choices. As all subjects belonged to the microeconomics class, there is not 
a lot of variation in age (average age = 20 years; Std. Dev.= 1.15) and knowledge about 
bonds (91% were knowledgeable about bonds), and this could be a factor behind the 
insignificant effect of age and knowledge of bonds on the investment choices. The vari-
able ‘Investment Experience’ takes on a value of 1 if the subjects had a prior investment 
experience of either stocks or bonds and zero otherwise. Interestingly, the subjects with 
investment experience are 52% less likely to invest in a Pakistani firm that is partially 
owned by a Chinese firm than in a purely Pakistani firm. Even though the percentage of 
subjects with investment experience is relatively small (only 13%), the results indicate 
that experienced subjects are more likely to opt for a purely Pakistani firm. Previous bad 
investment experience in an impure Pakistani firm could be one possible factor making 
the impure Pakistani firm less attractive to the experienced investors.  
The variable ‘Perception of China’ captures the influence of general perceptions 
about China on the investment behavior. Subjects who ranked China as “Enemy of 
Pakistan” are 35% less likely, while those who ranked China as “Worst Enemy of Paki-
stan” are 66% less likely to invest in a Pakistani firm with Chinese presence than those 
subjects who ranked China as a friend of Pakistan. The coefficient for the “Enemy of 
Pakistan” category, however, is insignificant. Only those subjects who possess strong 
negative feelings against China reflect these in their investment behavior as well. 
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Even though we used hypothetical firms in the experimental instructions, the gen-
eral perceptions about Pakistani and Chinese firms operating in Pakistan can influence 
the investor behavior and are controlled in the regression analysis. Subjects who believe 
Pakistani firms are worse than Chinese firms (variable: Perceptions of Pakistani firms) 
are almost twice more likely to invest an impure Pakistani firm with Chinese ownership 
than those subjects who think Pakistani firms are better than the Chinese firms. Howev-
er, subjects who believe Pakistani firms are as good as the Chinese firms do not behave 
differently compared to those who believe Pakistani firms are better than the Chinese 
firms. On the other hand, subjects who think Chinese firms are either better or as good 
as Pakistani firms (variable: Perceptions of Chinese firms) are approximately five times 
more likely to invest in the Pakistani firm with Chinese ownership in it than those sub-
jects who believe Chinese firms are worse than Pakistani firms. These results indicate 
that subjects with even weak positive perceptions of Chinese firms or strong negative 
perceptions of Pakistani firms are more likely to choose an impure Pakistani firm with 
Chinese ownership over a purely domestic Pakistani firm. 
5.1. Dominance Analysis 
The investor model discussed in Section 3 and the lab experiment in Section 4 use in-
vestment ratios of the Chinese firm in the Pakistani firm as a major factor influencing 
the investment decisions of the subjects. The logistic regression results reported in Ta-
ble 3 indicate that along with Chinese share, general perceptions about the Chinese and 
Pakistani firms also significantly influence the investment choices. Apparently, signifi-
cant coefficients for perceptions about Chinese and Pakistani firms are quite large in 
magnitude compared to those for the main explanatory variable. One might question 
which is the most important explanatory variable in the regression? Even though we 
use Chinese share as the main explanatory variable, we cannot claim it based on the 
regression results reported in Table 3. In order to identify the relative importance of 
the main independent variable (Chinese Share) in explaining the variance of invest-
ment choice (R-squared) in the logistic regression, a dominance analysis is performed, 
and the results are reported in Table 4. The dominance analysis identifies the marginal 
contribution of an explanatory variable as change in R-squared when that variable is 
added to the model (Azen & Traxel, 2009). The dominance analysis indicates that the 
main independent variable (Chinese Share) accounts for 35% of the variance in the 
dependent variable captured by the logistic regression and is relatively the most domi-
nant explanatory variable as well (Rank = 1). The dominance analysis strengthens the 
predictions of the investor model and validates the effectiveness of the experimental 
design in successfully detecting the role of Chinese share in the domestic individual in-
vestments. Apart from the main explanatory variable, general perception of the Chinese 
firms explains 20% of the variance, 13% of investment experience, 12% of general per-
ception of Pakistani firms, while opinion about China explains 10% of the total variance 
44
ISSN 2029-4581   eISSN 2345-0037   Organizations and Markets in Emerging Economies
in the investment choice captured by the logistic regression. Knowledge of bonds, age 
and gender played a minor role in the total variance.
TABLE 4 Standardized Dominance Estimates & Dominance Ranking
Estimate Ranking
Chinese Share 35% 1
Male 1% 8
Age 2% 7
Investment Experience 13% 3
Knowledge of Bonds 7% 6
Opinion about China 10% 5
Perception of Pakistani Firms 12% 4
Perception of Chinese Firms 20% 2
Note: Estimate represents the value of standardized dominance estimate.
6. Discussions and Conclusions
This study proposed a behavioral investor model to examine the choice of domes-
tic individual investors between a purely domestic firm and a domestic firm partially 
owned by a foreign firm. The investor model predicts a bell-shaped relation between 
the foreign firm’s ratio in the target firm and domestic individual investments in the 
target firm. The model is tested with the help of a controlled lab experiment in the 
China – Pakistan context. The experiment examined the individual investment choic-
es of Pakistani subjects between a purely Pakistani firm and a Pakistani firm with var-
ying Chinese presence: majority (60%), minority (22%) or portfolio (9%). Based on 
the behavioral investor model it was hypothesized that individual investors perceive 
Chinese minority investors positively compared to foreign portfolio or majority inves-
tors. The results from the lab experiment support the aforementioned hypothesis: in-
dividual investments in the impure Pakistani firm are maximum (56%) when Chinese 
ownership is 22%. 
There are several caveats in the existing study that are discussed here. 1) The sub-
jects in the experiment were students, and only 13% had an investment experience. It 
is possible that the experienced investors behave in a different manner and could be 
less prone to the behavioral biases. However, Chen et al. (2007) report that both expe-
rienced and inexperienced investors are equally prone to the behavioral biases. Hence 
the behavior of relatively inexperienced students in the current study might be no 
different than the experienced Pakistani investors. 2) The experimental subjects were 
educated, well connected to the world, and 91% had knowledge of the bond market. 
Several studies (Dhar & Zhu, 2006; Goo, Chen, Changmb & Yeh, 2010) report that 
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educated investors are less prone to the behavioral biases in their investment decisions. 
Hence the behavior of educated experimental subjects observed in the current experi-
ment might differ when compared to the actual investors with limited knowledge of the 
financial markets. 3) In the current experiment, the investment options were riskless. 
The behavioral response of individual investors to different FDI ratios when exercis-
ing decisions with uncertain and risky investments (such as stocks) could be different 
and might lead to a different ratio of foreign investment that attracts maximum local 
individual investors compared to the one observed in the current experiment. 4) The 
results in this study are based on a set of specified cutoffs (9% for portfolio investment, 
22% for minority investment, and 60% for majority investment). As mentioned, these 
cutoffs are based on prior literature on mergers and acquisition, and  a priori, there is no 
reason to expect that the results of hypothesis testing would be different if we use slight-
ly different values. At the same time, we acknowledge that by using a slightly different 
cutoff of minority investments (rather than 22%), we may receive a different maximized 
proportion of individual investors (I*) as compared to that in our study (56%). The 
reason is that what percentage constitutes a minority investment may still largely be 
perceived differently by investors based on their biases and experiences. Although we 
tried to control for this element in our study by conveying clearly to the respondents 
the differences between minority investments and other investments types, future work 
could additionally examine slightly different cutoffs to check the stability of results. 5) 
The experiment examines the influence of varying foreign ownership on individual do-
mestic investments in bonds (a form of lending) of the target firm. However, the own-
ership and lending mechanisms imply different interests and motivations. The behavior 
of individual investors might differ if investment in shares instead of bonds is examined. 
The study has several practical implications. First, we caution individual investors 
to be aware of the positive bias towards minority investments. While efficiency-liquid-
ity tradeoff provides several reasons why minority investment mode may have certain 
advantages over other investments modes, individual investors should take the invest-
ment decision more objectively by focusing on adjusted return provided. Second, this 
study provides useful implications to Chinese firms specifically and multinationals gen-
erally about potential risks associated with majority and portfolio investment modes in 
Pakistan’s context. Third, we provide managers in the local (Pakistani) firms a simple 
though useful model for recognizing potentially challenging competitors for attract-
ing individual investors. Precisely, managers in local (Pakistani) firms should be careful 
when they need to attract individual investors against a firm in which the foreign inves-
tor has minority ownership. Lastly, the study suggests that foreign investors aiming to 
maintain a certain level of domestic investors in the target country will be better able to 
do so if they also consider the effects associated to their ratio in the target firm.  
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Appendix A.  Post Experimental Survey Questions
1. Which of the following best describes your opinion? 
Choices Respondents (Percentage)
China is the best friend of Pakistan 0
China is a friend of Pakistan 3 (4%)
China is neither a friend nor an enemy of Pakistan 13 (17.33%)
China is an enemy of Pakistan 52 (69.33%)
China is the worst enemy of Pakistan 7 (9.33%)
2. Have you ever invested money in stocks or bonds? 
Choices Respondents (Percentage)
Yes 10 (13.33%)
No 65 (86.67%)
3. Do you know what a bond is? 
Choices Respondents (Percentage)
Yes 68 (90.67%)
No 7 (9.33%)
4. In your opinion, Pakistani companies operating in Pakistan are: 
Choices Respondents (Percentage)
Better than Chinese companies 7 (9.33%)
As good as Chinese companies 44 (58.67%)
Worse than Chinese companies 24 (32%)
5. In your opinion, Chinese companies operating in Pakistan are: 
Choices Respondents (Percentage)
Better than Pakistani companies 39 (52%)
As good as Pakistani companies 32 (42.67%)
Worse than Pakistani companies 4 (5.33%)
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Appendix B. Experimental Instructions
Thank you very much for taking out time and participating in the experiment. All the decisions that 
you take during the experiment and your performance will not be shared with anyone. The data col-
lected through the experiment will be used only for the purpose of research, and anonymity shall be 
maintained at all levels of research. 
The experiment is spread over 20 minutes. You are not allowed to communicate with each other. 
If anyone is found talking to someone else, he or she will be disqualified from the experiment. Kindly 
work on your own and if you have any questions, raise your hand. The experimenter will come to you 
to answer your questions. Only relevant questions will be answered. Use of mobile phones, laptops 
and other electronic devices is not allowed during the experiment. You will receive a participation 
fee of 100 rupees. Based on your decisions during the experiment you can further earn 100 rupees. 
Total money (participation fee along with earned money) will be provided to you in envelopes at 
the end of the experiment. 
The decisions during the experiment are represented in experimental units. 100,000 experimen-
tal units are equal to 50 rupees. 
Your Task
Suppose you have 100,000 experimental units and imagine you can invest in the bonds of Company 
A or in Company B. Both companies pay identical returns of 100,000 experimental units on your 
investment. Both companies are of Pakistani origin. Company A is 100% owned and controlled by 
Pakistanis. Company B has Pakistani and Chinese ownership mixed in different proportions. De-
pending on which country has the higher proportion of ownership, the managerial decisions rest 
with that country. Kindly take into account both of these variables while making decisions. You need 
to provide your decisions in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Cases Ownership details  of Company A
Owner details  
of Company B
In which company 
would you like to invest?
Case 1 100% ownership 
with Pakistani
91% owned by Pakistani and 9% 
owned by Chinese.
The decision power is fully exercised 
by Pakistani owners. Chinese inves-
tors do not have any decision powers.
Case 2 100% ownership 
with Pakistani
78% owned by Pakistani and 22% 
owned by Chinese.
The decision power mainly rests with 
Pakistani owners, but Chinese inves-
tors can influence the management 
decisions.
Case 3 100% ownership 
with Pakistani
40% owned by Pakistani and 60% 
owned by Chinese.
The decision power is fully exercised 
by the Chinese investors.
If you have any questions, raise your hand and wait for the experimenter. Only relevant questions 
will be answered.
